Criminal organizations’ conflicts and the electoral principle of democracy
Authors
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Lesly Estefania Flores Rivera
Universidad de Guanajuato y Auditoría Superior del Estado de Guanajuato
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0933-0391
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Abstract
The prevailing view suggests that conflicts involving criminal organizations undermine democracy. Using mixed-effects linear models and data from V-Dem and HIIK, this paper highlights that while there is a relationship between the intensity of such conflicts and the electoral component of democracy, not all indicators are equally affected. During electoral periods, these conflicts do not impact freedom of expression or association, but do affect the cleanliness of elections, largely due to the strategic management of violence by officials. Outside of these periods, the conflicts impact both freedoms. However, in democracies with strong electoral systems, conflicts are less intense, partially attributed to the intervention of civil organizations.
Keywords:
Criminal organizations’ conflicts , electoral democracy , clean elections , freedom of expression , reedom of associationReferences
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